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ABSTRACT
This paper shows how government financing decisions can influence the
corporate decision to use debt or equity finance. In particular, it is
shown that an increase in the stock of taxable government debt reduces the
equilibrium quantity of corporate debt, and that an increase in the stock
of tax—free government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity of corporate
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INTRODUCTION
This paper shows how government borrowing decisions can influence the
corporate decision to use debt or equity finance. In particular, it is shown
that an increase in taxable government debt reduces the equilibrium quantity
of corporate debt, and that an increase in tax-free debt reduces the
equilibrium quantity of corporate equity. This provides a possible
explanation forthepost-war increase in the corporatedebt-to—equityratio,
andmay explain the constancy of the debt—to—GNP ratio noted by Friedman
(1981).
Itiswell-documented that U.S. corporations have made increasing use of
debt finance inthe post-World War IIyears [Ciccolo (1981),Gordon and
Malkiel(1981), and Holland and Myers (1978)]. The reason for this rise in
thecorporate debt-equity ratio is not well documented.
The most compelling explanations are micro—economic. For example, Gordon
and Malkiel argue that corporate leverage is determined by a trade—off between
bankruptcy cost and a tax advantage to debt, and that a burgeoning belief in
the stability of the economy lowered the estimated probability of bankruptcy,
and hence raised optimal leverage. Friedman (1981) notes that the aggregate
nonfinancial debt—to—GNP ratio has been roughly constant the last thirty
years, but does not explain why corporations have increased their use of debt
overthis period.
Inview of the typical micro—economic approach to corporate leverage
decisions, the seminal paper by Miller (1977) takes an ingenious twist in
showing that the aggregate leverage ratio may be determinate even if leverage
at the level of the individual firmisnot determinate. The Miller model thus2
raises the possibility that macro—phenomena may have something to do with the
post—war increase in corporate leverage.In addition, because the Miller
model explains aggregate leverage, it offers some hope of explaining the
constancyof the debt-to—GNP ratio.If the wealth-to-GNP ratio is
approximately constant, then Friedman may merely have measured a constant
debt—to—wealth ratio.
The basic point of Miller's paper is that the tax treatment of both the
suppliers and demandersof assets affect the equilibrium configuration of
assetsupplies. For example, interest payments on debt are a tax-deductible
expensefor corporations, while payments to equity holders are not.
Considering only the supplier, tax laws favor debt over equity. On the other
hand, debt returns are taxed more heavily than equity returns at the personal
level, so considering only the demand side, tax laws favor equity over debt.
This paper shows that in a model like Miller's, an exogenous increase in
government debt will reduce the (endogenously determined) supply of similarly
taxed,privately—supplied assets.1 This result will hold as long as the
distribution of wealth across tax brackets is approximately unchanged by the
increase in government debt. it
This argument is presented analytically in Section 1, where' is assumed
that equity is riskiess. The argument is not particularly sensitive to
assumptionsabout whether government debt is or is not net wealth. Much of
thispaper is devoted to analyzing the above argument in a model where it is
assumed that there is risky equity, and three riskless assets: tax-free
municipal debt, federal debt, and corporate debt. There is a progressive
income tax, with a lower tax on equity income than on debt income, and a
corporate income tax. There are no bankruptcy or other costs to issuing
debt.2 The principal conclusions are that3
1) An increase in taxable government debt always reduces the supply of
corporate debt but has an uncertain effect on the quantity of equity; an
increase in tax-free government debt reduces the supply of corporate equity
but has an uncertain effect on corporate debt.
2) Changes in the inflation rate have no effect on the equilibrium
aggregatedebt—to—wealth or corporate debt-to-equity ratio, despite the
taxation and deductibility of nominal rather than real interest payments.
Thisassumes that there are no costs to debt finance. If there are bankruptcy
or other debt costs, increases in the inflation rate raise leverage.
Section2 introduces the model under uncertainty, and Section 3 derives
the comparative static results discussed above. Section 4 explores the
implications of government debtnot being net wealth, and shows that
government debt issues can have real effects in this model even if future tax
paymentsare capitalized. Section 5 discusses one implausible predicion of
the model and Section 6 concludes.
Beforepresenting the argument explicitly, it will prove useful to examine
some historical time series which bear on the theory. The argument is that
increases in taxable government debt are associated with reductions in the
private supply of taxable debt.
The first column of Table 1 presents the market value of taxable debt
outstanding as a fraction of total wealth.3 This series is not completely
constantduring the post—war years, but it appears reasonably constant. This
seriesis more striking when examined in conjunction with Column 2,in which
thefederal debt-to—wealth ratio is displayed. Despite a substantial
reduction in federal indebtedness, the total taxable debt-to—wealth ratio in
the seventies was at about the same level as in the fifties.4
Figure 1 plots the ratio of taxable debt--excluding government debt—-to
wealth (the rising curve) against the ratio of taxable government debt to
wealth (the falling line). Again the inverse relationship is dramatic.
Figure2 depicts the market-value—of-debt to firm-value ratio for the
business sector as a whole. This has risen throughout the postwar period.It
is not perfectly correlated with the debt—to-wealth ratio in Figure 1 because
the latter includes household issues of debt, and also because the firm
value—to-wealthratio has changed over the period.4 Itappears clear that
Figure 1 is potentially useful in explaining Figure 2.
1.EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CERTAINTY
Thissection develops Miller's model under certainty and demonstrates that
an increase in taxable government debt lowers the corporate debt to equity
ratio. The purpose is heuristic, so the model is as simple as possible.
There are three assets: equity, which is untaxed, and corporate and
government debt, both of which are taxed. There is a progressive tax at the
rate u on interest income, where i indexes the tax bracket. Within each
tax bracket, there are n1 identical individuals, each with wealth W..
Corporate income is taxed at the rate e, and interest payments are a
tax—deductible expense.It is assumed that 0 <
Because all assets are riskless, individuals chooseamong assets solely on
thebasis of after-tax return.This model is exactly that of Miller (1977),
but with the trivial addition of government debt as an additional asset.
1.1 Demand Equilibrium
Let a be the return on equity, and let r be the gross-of-tax return on
debt.It is easy to see that individuals will hold equity if a > (1-u)r5
and they will hold debt if the inequality is reversed. Define u, the
marginal tax bracket, by
a= (1 — u*)r (1)
In equilibrium, the quantity of assets supplied must equal that demanded:
E =
U> U
F +B =D(u*); D' >0 (2)
u<u*
value
whereE is the market/of equity, F is the market value of federal
government debt, and B is the market value of corporate debt. The notation
u>umeans that the summation is taken over all investors in tax brackets
greaterthan u*.
1.2Supply Equilibrium
Takethe quantity of government debt as given. The advantage to a firm of
using debt instead of equity finance is given by a - r(1 — e). Fl-ms are
indifferent between debt and equity finance only if
0a_r(1_e)r(1_u*)_r(1_e)r(e_U*) (3)
Miller's important insight was that if u < e, firms will find debt finance
cheaper and they will issue more debt and use the proceeds to retire equity.
From (2), we can see that if E falls and F + B rises, u will rise. Thus
thereis a natural mechanism ensuring that u* =e
The equilibrium conditions (2) and (3) are graphed in Figure 3, where the
vertical line at e =u*represents (3), and the line OB represents the demand
for debt as a function of u*, which is given by (2). Equilibrium occurs at
point A, where B =- F.6
1.3 Changes in Government Debt
Suppose now that the government issues additional debt, increasing F to
F'. In general, this will change interest rates and savings behavior, as
investors absorb the debt issue in their portfolios. The important point,
however, is that as longas investorsallchange theirsavings behavior in the
same way, so that is not changed, then the debt-to-total wealth





and we know that u* is unchanged, since by (3) it must equal the corporate tax
rate, e. Thus, as long as the distribution of wealth across tax brackets is
unchanged, the debt—to—wealth ratio is unchanged.If the government
debt—to—wealthratio rises, the corporate debt-to—wealth ratio falls. This is
a consequence of maximizing behavior by both investors and firms.
1.4 Comments
i) This analysis has ignored the issues which arise when government debt
is not net wealth. That interesting case is treated in Section 4.
ii) In writing the equilibrium conditions (2) we implicitly imposed a no
short—sale constraint on investors. If short-sales were allowed, therewould
beno equilibrium because high tax—bracket investors wouldissue debt, deduct
theinterest payments, and use the proceeds to buy equity, earning a positive
return on a zero net investment.This is known as tax arbitrage, and would be
pursuedinfinitely by investors.In a model like this, it is necessary to
assume (as does Miller) that only corporations canborrow.57
ifl) When there is municipal debt, the analysis is similar, except that
municipal debt becomes a perfect substitute for equity, since both are
untaxed. Auerbach and King (1981) analyze the certainty case with taxable
equity, taxable debt, and tax—free debt. They show that in equilibrium, there
will be three clienteles, with investors in the top tax brackets holding only
tax-free debt, investors in middle brackets holding only equity, and low
bracket investors holding only taxable debt.
2.EQUILIBRIUM WITH UNCERTAINTY
This section presents a model similar in spirit to that in the previous
section, but with more realistic assumptions. Specifically
i) Equity returns are assumed to be risky and taxed at the rate
<u.
ii) There is perfectly anticipated inflation at the rate ii,andthe tax
system is not indexed.
iii) There is tax—free municipal debt, M, with a real safe rate of return,
p.
iv)All investors may short—sell equity.Investors in high tax brackets
may not sell taxable debt, and those in low tax brackets may not sell tax—free
debt.
It is still assumed that corporate and federal debt are riskiess and that
they receive the same tax treatment. Note that there is no safe asset which
receives the same tax treatment as equity. Thus, Auerbach and King's (1981)
spanning condition does not hold. Markets are incomplete in the sense of
Taggart (1980).8
2.1 The Model
To simplify the expostion, assume that there is a single, price—taking
corporation.The analysis is concerned onlywith investor demands for risky
asopposedto riskiess assets. The composition of demand across risky assets
is an interesting question in its own right, but it is a subsidiary issue in
this paper.6
Wewill introduce uncertainty by using the model of intertemporal
consumption and portfolio allocation introduced by Merton (1971). This has
thedual advantages of allowing investors to have arbitrary utility functions,
and yet resulting in a mean-variance model of asset pricing.In addition, the
intertemporal nature of the problem imposes multiple sources of uncertainty on
the investor, and Merton's continuous—time asset-pricing model provides a
convenient way to handle this analytically.It is assumed that the
corporation generates a gross real cash flow, the dynamic behavior of which is




where G is the instantaneous conditional mean cash flow, is the
instantaneous conditional variance of cash flow, and dz is a Wiener process.
Bondholders are paid a nominal return of r +r, whichis a tax-deductible
expensefor the corporation. The real, after-tax cost of debt finance is thus
(r + ir)(1 — e) — ii = r(1 — e) — eir (6)
Thereal gross cash flow dgistaxed at the rate e. After taxes, the net real
returnavailable to equity holders is given by









and B is the quantity of debt issued by the firm.ThedZe term in (7)
allowsforthe possibility of capital gains and losses on equity for reasons
other than unexpected current cash flow. Note that a,y,and v depend on
leverage. In addition, adependson the inflation rate as well as the
gross—of-tax real bond rate, r.
We can also calculate the expected real after-tax returns to investors on
debt and equity. The after-tax real return on equity is (1 —c)a
—
andthat on taxable debt is (1 —u)r
—
U1W,
while that on municipal debt
issimply p, with no inflation distortion because the returns are untaxed.
The safe assets are distinguishable only by tax treatment.Investors will
neverhold both taxable and tax-free debt, unless they are in the marginal tax
bracket u*, defined by
(1_.u*)r_u*ir=p (8)
Investors with tax rate u are indifferent between taxable and tax-free debt,
Investors for whom u >uwill hold municipal debt, and those for whom u <u
will hold taxable debt. A change in r will generally require a change in p if
(8) is to be satisfied.
To ensure that an equilibrium exists, we must constrain high—bracket
investors not to issue taxable debt, and we constrain low—bracket investors
not to issue tax—free debt. There will be no other constraints, however; all
investors are free to short-sell equity and the one kind of debt they are
permittedto hold.10
2.2Asset Demand
Following Merton (1971), the investor chooses ,thefraction of his








where C is consumption, W is the investor's wealth, A is the rateof time
preference, a* and r* are the after—tax, real expected assetrates of return,
and Et is the expectation as of time t.
There are other sources of uncertainty besides equity returns, however.
If the government issues additional debt (taxable or tax-exempt)it is
simultaneously endowing future tax liabilities (to be denoted L) upon
investors. In general, this also induces a change in equilibrium interest
rates. The rational investor will take into account this uncertainty,and
will treat L and r as additional state variables when choosing an optimal




With three state variables--W, L, and r—-it can be shown (Merton, 1971)
that maximizing (9) is equivalent to maximizing
I = etu(Ct) ++ JW[W((a* - r*) + r*) - C] (10)
+Jc+JLa + rr
+JLLb +
+ J4bR(l_c)+ Jd4fR (1_c) +JLfbRLr11
where =-, etc.,a2= y2+v2+2yVC0V(ZZe)R1 is the correlation




and C5 is the expected consumption path which maximizes (9), conditional
on information at time t.Equation (10) is really just the investors Bellman
function as approximated by a Taylor expansion.
The first—order conditions for optimal C andare
=u'- =0 (ha)
=jwW(a* - r*)+Jwwa4(1_c)2 + WLI4L +
8 (hib)
which may be rewritten




is the inverse of the investor's coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The
terms and can be interpreted by differentiating (ha):
—,,dC —,,dC 'wrF
Sincean increase in future tax liabilities constitutes a reduction in current
netwealth, it is reasonable to suppose that = where M
(0<M<l) isthe fractionof true tax liabilities which are perceived by the
investor. Thus WL = '\ can be positive or negative. For our
purposes,itwill be necessaryto assume either that iszero, or
that Wr'WW is insensitive to changes in W, L, andr. With this12
assumption, most of the analysis to follow will be as if wealth were the only
state variable.
2.3 Asset Supplies
The purpose of this section is to derive an expression for the value of
the firm, which will enable us to see how the Miller equilibrium is
characterizedunder uncertainty. Equation (12) tells us the investor's dollar
demand for the risky asset. We will now use (12) to solve explicitly for the
market value of the firm; this will permit us to solve for the equilibrium u*,
given the assumption that firms maximize their market value. By aggregating





(cz —rV +nD (13)
where
JWLbL 'rr-Wrr




Now multiply (13) by a2E, and recall thata2E2 =E2(y2+v2+2yvCov(z,ze))
is a constant. For ease of notation, let02E2 y .Substituting in the
definitions of a (equation (7)) and p (equation (8)) at the same time gives













Solving (14) for E yields







1 1 1 1
The market value of the firm is thus
E + B = [(1 - e)G - (2 4(1'1) N(1-c1))'] (17)
+ B(1 -[r(1 - e) - eli])
Notethat if alltaxes and inflation are zero, and ifwealthis the only state




whichis the usual expression for the value of the firm in a mean—variance
model [Jensen (1972)]. For future reference, note that the value of afirm
behaveslike a consol when the interest rate changes.
In a model such as this, with distorting taxes, investors usually will not
be unanimous about the choice of financial policy. Auerbach and King (1981)
show that if the firm's financial policy has any effect on investor's
opportunity sets——as it will unless investors can undo on personal account any
action the firm takes-—then investors will disagree about financial policy.
Nevertheless, I assume that the (competitive) firmwillchoose financial14
policy so as to maximize its market value.
10
The expression multiplying B in (17) is crucial to the analysis.(17)
implies that the firm will be indifferent about financial policy only if
—e)r
—eitJ = 1 (18)
By using the definition ofand collecting terms in itandr, (18) can be
rewritten to show that
0 =(r+it)[(1-e) N.(1 -c.)- N.(1-u.)- N.(1-u*)]
1 1 1 1
(19)
By choosing u to set the bracketed expression equal to zero, the right-hanc
side expression is set to zero, independently of the level of the inflation
rate. This demonstrates that changes in the inflation rate leave unaffected
the condition for the firm to be in financial equilibrium. Since financial
equilibrium is unaffected by inflation rate changes, I henceforth assume that
it= 0.
2.4 Market Equilibrium





+(1 — u*) Ni
u<u*
1 u>u
It is easy to see that, given A1 and n1, and hence N1 there will be only one u
for which (20) holds.(The expression on the left—hand side is strictly
increasing in u. )Theinterpretation of (20) is clearer if we assume that
4nvestorshave constant r-elative risk aversion.
12Then A1 =R4,where
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increasing function of the total amount of equity issued by the firm.Let
EH denote the amount of equity held by high tax-bracket investors (those for
whom u >u*).From (12), we have
H 1
n.D.
E = N.(a(1—c.)—r(1—u*)) + 1 1
u>u*
1 1 c'• U>ULCJa













In the vicinity of equilibrium, aE





since u >eeven if c. =0,and u becomes larger as increases
H
(see footnote 13). Thus, .—> 0.
Figure 4 shows how equilibrium is determined. Lower case letters






andremember that w is fixed independently of changes in the composition of17
assets.The d(e) schedule is a graph of
d(e) =+ eh(e); e' >
Wesaw that increases in the quantity of equity raise the demand for equity by
those who also hold municipal debt; this is why the d(e) schedule is
upward—sloping.If the system were at point A, u would be too high, and
firms would have an incentive to issue additional equity, from (17). This
increase in the supply of equity leads to additional equity demand by
municipal debt holders, who in turn sell some of their municipal debt. This
lowers u, and leads to a greater fraction of investors holding municipal
debt. The process stops at A.
2.5 Effects of Tax Rate Changes
The equilibrium condition (20) allows us to infer ininediately what will be
the effects of tax rate changes on financial equilibrium. Any general tax
rate change will induce an offsetting change in equilibrium u in order for
(20) to be satisfied. Previous arguments have shown that if u rises,
corporate leverage rises, and if u falls, corporate leverage falls.
Therefore, increases in the corporate tax rate e or in the equity tax rate
will raise private leverage, while increases in the personal tax rate or
ordinary income will lower private leverage. While it is common to speak of
u* asthe marginaltax bracket, changes in rates ininframarginaltax brackets
willaffect u. The Miller model under certainty predicts that changes in
only the maximum tax rate will leave financial equilibrium unaffected; under
uncertainty this is no longer true.18
3.COMPARATIVE STATICS
I will consider two comparative static experiments: a change in the
quantity of taxable government debt outstanding (municipal debt may be treated
analogously) and a change in the scale of the firm.I will assume that w
remains unchanged, i.e. ,thatthe distribution of wealth across tax brackets
is constant, and that government debt behaves like a consol in response to
changes in the interest rate.I will also assume throughout that consumption
is unaffected by interest rate changes, i.e. that is zero.
To perform the comparative static calculations it is necessary to make an
assumption about the effect of government debt issues on saving. To
understand the importance of this, it is necessary to digress briefly on the
implications of whether or not investors perceive future tax liabilities.
When the government uses debt finance instead of tax finance to pay for
current expenditures, it obligates itself to collect taxes in the future to
pay off the debt. With perfect capital markets and no distorting taxes, the
present value of these future tax collections is equal to the value of the
current debt issue. The current value of an investor's wealth is lowered by
expected future tax liabilities.If individuals are aware of these future tax
liabilities, Barro's (1974) argument implies that in equilibrium, investors
will purchase the newly-issued government debt in proportion to their
endowment of future tax liabilities.14 The increase in government debt is
absorbed entirely through new saving; given a level of government spending,
gross aggregate wealth will rise by the amount of the debt issue, and each
individual's net wealth will be unchanged by the use of debt finance in lieu
of tax finance.In effect, when capital markets are perfect, investors are
indifferent between paying taxes now and paying taxes later. This implies
that interest rates are unchanged by a new issue of government debt.19
Suppose on the other hand that investors do not perceive future tax
liabilities. When the government issues additional debt the price of bonds
falls because the increased demand for bonds (if any) is insufficient to meet
the increase in supply. The interest rate increase lowers the price of assets
generally. The most extreme case would occur when wealth was unchanged in the
new equilibrium. The increase in debt would have then been completely
absorbed through an increase in interest rates.
I will use s to measure the extent to which aggregate wealth rises when
there is an increase in the stock of (taxable or tax-free) government debt. 15
=0signifies that aggregate wealth is unchanged, and that the increase in
debt has been absorbed into the economy through an increase in interest
rates.o =1signifies that the debt issue has been absorbed through an
increase in saving, and that interest rates have not changed. The use ofis
a device which makes use of Barro's elegant insights and avoids complicating
the analysis needlessly.
It is assumed throughout that tax rates are unchanged. The increase in
government debt can be viewed as resulting from increased government spending
oras due to a reduction in a lump—sum tax, but not from a change in the
personal or corporate tax rates. Money is excluded from this model, so the
possibility of an inflation tax as a third means of finance is ignored.
The main results are that an increase in the stock of taxable government
debt always reduces corporate debt, but has uncertain effects on the quantity
of equity. There is ambiguity only when the market value of the firm changes
due to an interest rate increase, i.e., when <1.When =1,a reduction
in corporate debt implies a corresponding increase in equity. An increase in
the stock of tax—free debt reduces the stock of equity, but has an uncertain
effect on the stock of corporate debt.(Again, this is ambiguous only when
<1.)20
Beforeperforming the comparative static calculations, I will explain the
strategy to be used. Suppose that the government issues dF in new taxable
debt. Private saving will change, and total wealth will increase by a
fraction o of the government debt issue. Thus, c146dF.16 Extensive use
will be made of the condition that the total demand for assets by investors in
hightax brackets must equal the total wealth of high—bracket investors, i.e.
that
EH(E,r)+M(r)=
Givenr, W, M, and w, and remembering thatEH is an increasing function of
E, this equation implies an equilibrium quantity of total equity. If we
totallydifferentiate thisequation, we obtain
*- * —dMdEH—3EHdM dr3EH dE
w-w o (___+).,+—.—.
Thismay be solved for dE/dF to give
H1 H
= (wo - (L + .±i) .a!.) (25)
dF aE ardr dF
Equation(25) can be used to examine the question of how equilibrium supplies
of equity and debt change when the Federal government issues more debt. The
only problem in evaluating (25) is calculating .,whichcan be shown
to equal17
dr —(1 — o)r (26)
dFV+M
We are now in a position to calculate (25).
Finally, in what follows we will make use of the fact (from (21)) that
3EH_E 3EXEH (27)21
This expression is positive, as may be seen by evaluating the elasticity of
EH with respect to E, using (22). Doing so yields
3EHE- E .
-
wherethe bracketed term is positive. Hence the elasticity is greater than
one.
3.1 Increase in Taxable Government Debt18
With (25), we are now in a position to ask what happens to the quantity of
corporate equity and debt when there is an increase in the stock of taxable
government debt.
A.The Quantity of Corporate Debt
An increase in the quantity of taxable government debt reduces the
equilibrium quantity of corporate debt.
To show this, we will compute
dB —dVdE
(28)
Inserting (25) into (28), we obtain
—1
dB —dVdr aEH * dM3EH dr - - (-—,(w6- ( + p—)- 29)
and substituting and rewriting, it can be shown that the right-hand side of
(29) is equivalent to
H
- (1 - M+E)+w+(M+EH)(16) (30)
Every term within the square brackets is positive. Hence, increases in the
quantity of taxable government debt always reduce the equilibrium quantity of
corporate debt.22
B.The Quantity of Corporate Equity
An increase in the quantity of taxable government debt has an ambiguous
effect on the quantity of corporate equity.
Evaluating (25), we obtain
=
H
(wo +___- EH( - 1)] (25')
H
In evaluating .—,using(21), it is helpful to notice that r(B +E)is
independent of r when ir =0.
The sign of (25') is ambiguous, since the elasticity ofEH with respect
to E is greater than one. When o is close to one, f-will be positive.
o close to one implies that the increase that the increase in government debt
is absorbed by saving. Consequently, interest rates do not change much, the
market value of the firm does not change much, and the unambiguous drop in the
quantity of corporate debt implies that there must be a concomitant
unambiguous rise in the quantity of corporate equity.
3.2 Increase in Tax-Free Government Debt
Similar results may be derived for changes in the quantity of municipal
debt. An increase in municipal debt always "crowds out" equity, but has an
ambiguous effect on debt, except when a is close to 1.
A.The Quantity of Corporate Equity
An increase in the quantity of tax—free government debt reduces the
equilibrium quantity of corporate equity.
In the same way that (25) was derived, we can obtain
H dE.,aE , aEdr — , W 0 -- < 023
H
The inequality follows since 1 > woand .—andare both positive.
B. The Quantity of Corporate Debt
Anincrease in the quantity of tax-free government debt has an ambiguous








Using (27), this becomes
—1
dB - * (1-a)(V-E)1aE1 EH(l -o)
V+F
-V+F
The sign is ambiguous except when =1.In that case, >0,which
is sensible since when s =1,interest rates do not change and the market
value of the firm is unaffected by the increase in the stock of tax—free
debt. Thus, a decrease in the quantity of equity outstanding will imply an
increase in the quantityof debt.
3.3Changes in the Scale of the Firm
If government debt is net wealth, then a rise in the stock of taxable or
tax—free government debt will in the short run increase interest rates. Given
the stock of capital, the value of the corporate sector will fall. The
corporate sector will in turn reduce investment, and in the long run the
capital stock will fall, causing a change in the mean and variance of cash
flows. The value of the firm will fall further as the capital stock drops
(real crowding out occurs). What is the effect on the quantity of equity and
debt as the scale of the firm changes?24
Suppose that the value of the firm changes by dV. The equilibrium change
in EHwill then be dEH =w*d4 = w*dVassuming that interest rates and
hence the market values of taxable and tax-free government debt do not change








The effect on the quantity of debt is less clear, since
dB_1 dE v_-iv-
(32)can, however, be rewritten as
-1 1M
dE 1aEH E E '' 1B+M+F
The elasticity in parentheses is greater than 1.As an empirical matter, the
quantity of municipal debt outstanding is small relative to the total of
corporate and federal debt outstanding, so it seems likely that
M B +M + F
in which case >0.
Whenthe capital stock can change what will be the long—run effect on B of
a change in outstanding taxable government debt? If=1,changes in
government debt have no real effects, so consider the case where 0, and
suppose that ispositive.25
Theincrease in taxable government debt lowers B, from (29). As interest
rates have risen, the firm will invest less and for any given interest rate, V
will fall. The fall in V lowers B still more. The initial drop in B is
reinforced by the later decrease in the scale of the firm. The net long—run
effectis greater than would be suggested by calculating (28) alone.
4. WHAT IF GOVERNMENT DEBT IS NOT NET WEALT}
Theimplications of the model developed in Sections 2and 3hingeonthe
importantassumption that the distribution of wealth across tax brackets is
unchanged by changes in the composition and level of government debt. This is
a plausible assumption (or at least a reasonable approximation) when
government debt is net wealth, since every individual has a fixed rate of time
preference, and individuals have identical utility functions. If there are
tax clienteles for government debt, however, then the Barro theorem can be
false.19
If all future tax liabilities are endowed upon those who are in the
clientele which holds government debt, the Barro result still holds. In this
case, however, the results in Section 4 do not hold——increases in government
debt will have no effect on corporate leverage. High bracket investors will
have unchanged portfolios, and low bracket investors will completely absorb
theincrease in government debt.
To examine the other extreme, suppose that allfuture tax liabilities are
endoweduponthose who hold only tax-free municipal debt. A possible
equilibriumwould be for those in high tax brackets to nevertheless hold the
newtaxable debt, but this would conflict with the principle that the same
investor never hold riskiess assets with different after—taxreturns.
Instead,high bracket investors in the aggregate would try to increase their26
holdings of tax-free debt, and low—bracket investors would be left to absorb
the increase in taxable debt. The market return on tax-free debt would fall
and that on taxable debt would rise. From (8), u would rise. Corporations
would then retire debt and issue more equity, taking advantage of the relative
inexpensiveness of equity. The process would halt eventually, with a new u
greaterthan the u that existed in the beginning.20 The aggregate equity
to wealth ratio would rise.
Itis possible to show in this model, however, that individuals in
inframarginaltax brackets will have their utility changed by changes in
corporateleverage. To see this, consider equation (10) in which, for
simplicity, wealth is the only state variable.I will show that leverage
changes necessarily affect the utility of investors in inframarginal tax
brackets.






Hold consumption and wealth fixed. Utility will then be unchanged with
changes in aggregate leverage only if the expression tW(a* -r*)
21
is independent of leverage,where is optimally chosen. This
expression may be rewritten
(3.W.
—r*)= (1 - c1)(l-e)(G — r(B+E))+
+ rE((1—e)(1—c)
-(1—u1))) (34)













<0)will demand a smaller fraction of total
equity as corporate leverage decreases (E rises, for a given B +E).
Expression (34) shows that utility is independent of leverage only if the
equity share rises as corporate leverage decreases. Thus, I have shown that
with a progressive tax system, changes in leverage will in general affect
investor utility, even though corporations are indifferent about leverage.
22
Several comments are in order:
1) The comparative static analysis in Section 4 ignores the kind of effect
I have just discussed. Even if future tax liabilities are distributed in such
a way that all investors change their wealth proportionally, there canstill
be real effects operating through the portfolio decision. The case in Section
4 where=1(increases in government debt are fully absorbed by increased
saving) is therefore at best only an approximation to the case where
government debt is not net wealth.
2) The result that changes in the level of government debt have real
effects is not surprising since the structure of the model prohibits investors
fromhaving Hcomplete access" to capital markets.If all investors could buy
and sell unlimited qualtities of all assets,23 government debt would have no
real effects, andit is certainthat themodel would not yield a plausible
equilibrium (see the previous comments about the need for constraints which
prohibit tax arbitrage).28
5.PLAUSIBILITY OF THE MODEL
In this section 1wishto consider a prediction of the model which
appears to be false: that the tax rate at which investors are indifferent
between taxable and tax—free debt is greater than the corporate tax rate.
While this conclusion is troublesome for the model, I will argue that there
aremitigating circumstances in practice so that the main conclusions of the
model could nevertheless be basically correct.
5.1The Predicted Marginal Tax Rate
Whether or not there are capital gains taxes, we have seen (see footnote
11) that the model predicts that u >e, i.e. , the tax rate at which
individualsare indifferent between taxable and tax-free riskless debt exceeds
the corporate tax rate. Gordon and Malkiel (1981, Appendix B), however, show
that the actual marginal tax bracket is around 25 percent,24 which is
substantially less than the statutory corporate tax rate of 46 percent.
The condition u* >ewill be an equilibrium property of any Miller-type
model. To understand this result, one can think of firms as being a conduit
for equity holders, who do their borrowing through the firm. Because of the
interest deductibility, firms can offer a higher interest rate on debt and
still find borrowing profitable relative to the cost of issuing equity.In a
certainty world, borrowing will be profitable for the firm until the return on
debt has been increased by the full amount of the saving due to the interest
deduction—-only then will the firm be indifferent between debt and equity
finance. The model in this paper shows that the same kind of result holds
even when there is uncertainty-—in fact, uncertainty raises u above e, even
when there are no capital gains taxes.29
Anincrease in corporate leverage raises u, so that if u' in the real
world is lower than theory predicts, it can be because firmsissueless debt
than the theory predicts, which would occur if there were costs to issuing
debt.One relevant piece of empirical evidence along these lines isprovided
by Cordes and Sheffrin (1981)who use Treasurydata to show that, on average,
forU.S. firms an additional dollar of interest expense results in only Z.33
of additional tax deductions. This is without taking account of tax
carrybacks and carryforwards, but Cordes and Sheffrin show that inability to
use tax credits tends to persist among relatively unprofitable firms. This
minimizes the value of the carrybacks and carryforwards.
Anotherpossibility is suggested by the results of Skelton (1980) who
finds that for short—term taxable and tax-exempt debt, the marginal personal
tax rate is close to the corporate tax rate, while for long—term debt, the
marginal personal tax rate is lower. This finding may allow a reconciliation
of the empirical finding of Gordon and Malkiel that the marginal personal tax
rateis low, and the theoretical prediction of this and other Miller—type
modelsthat the marginal personal tax rate should be close to the corporate
tax rate.
5.2Inflation and Leverage Revisited
If there are costs to debtfinance, as theremust be toreconcile the
Gordon and Malkiel finding with the implications of this modeL, then a change
in the inflation rate will have an effect on corporate leverage.




where x =x(B)represents the dependence of some parameter in the valuation
equation on the level of debt, i.e., x is the cost of issuingdebt.23 If
x =0,then (20) is still the first—order condition for optimal leverage.If
x $0,however, then (20) does not hold and the inflation rate does not drop
out.
Inflation leaves leverage unchanged when there are no debt costs because
the tax advantage to debt finance vanishes in equilibrium. When the inflation
rate changes, it affects the after-tax costs to borrowing and returns to
lending in the same way, and thus has no effect, because there is no marginal
tax advantage to debt.
When there is a cost to debt finance, the marginal tax advantage to debt
finance (the negative of the first term in (36)) is equated to the marginal
cost of debt finance (the second term in (36)), which is greater than zero.
Hence there is a positive tax advantage to debt in equilibrium,24 and when
the inflation rate changes, it lowers the after—tax borrowing cost by more
than it raises the after-tax return. Hence the tax advantage to debt for any
given interest rate is increased by a rise in the inflation rate, and it
follows that if there are costs to debt, firms will use more debt finance if
there is an increase in the inflation rate.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that government financing policy has important
implications for private financial decisions. Two important facts about the
postwar U.S. economy——the constancy of the debt-to—wealth ratio and the rise
in the corporate debt—to—equity ratio-—are consistent with the predictions of
the model. An important caveat is that the results were derived in a model
where financial intermediation is ignored. At the very least, intermediaries31
have the potential to transform the tax and risk characteristics of the asets
they hold, and thus could affect the conclusions of this model in an important
way.
The model presented here, if developed more fully, may also provide a
useful way to think about severa] other issues, such as the effect of
government debt policy on investment and output, and the commingled effect of
inflation and taxes on investment.
With respect to the latter issue, this model has the implication that,
despite the deductibility of nominal interest payments on corporate debt,
changes in the inflation rate need not affect the corporate after-tax
borrowing rate, because there is no tax advantage to debt in equilibrium.32
DataAppendix
Thefollowing asset stock data, all from the Flow of Funds Sector Balance
Sheets (annual, year—end outstandings) were used:
F: Net financial Liabilities of the U.S. government, excluding state and
local holdings of federal debt.
M: Net financial liabilities (non—financial sector) of state and local
governments, plus holdings of federal debt.
B: Total credit market instruments (includes bonds, loans, mortgages,
etc.)issuedby non—financial corporate and non—corporate business.
E:Market value of corporate equity, excluding investment fund shares,
plus equity value of non-corporate business, valued at replacement cost.
HH: Liabilities issued by households. Mortgages valued at estimated
market value; other liabilities at book value.
W:Total wealth (F + M+B+E÷ Household tangible assets).
,:Annualfourth quarter to fourth quarter percentage change in the
personal consumption expenditures deflator.
The long—tern debt was all crudely adjusted to market value by assuming
thatthe annual rate of retirement of book debt was four percent; that the
weightedaverage maturity of the debt was 15 years, andthat market value
equaled book value in1947.26 It was assumed (based upon a breakdown in the
1980 Economic Report of the President) that 55 percent of federal government
debtand 75 percent of business debt was long-term. Equity was valued at
market, and tangible assets (for the household and non-corporate business
sectors) were valued at replacement cost.33
FOOTNOTES
1This crowding out" is financial, and should not be confused with real
crowdingout (which may or may not occur), where government purchases of goods
and services lead to a reduction in private investment.
2The model in this paper is essentially an extension of that in Auerbach
and King (1981).
3Federai debt is measured here as net financial liabilities of the
federal government-—thus excluding agency holdings of federal assets——less
stateand local government holdings of federal liabilities. The idea is to
presenta measure of the stock of federal libailities which must be absorbed
by the private sector. By the same token, Column 3 displays the tax-free
government debt—to-wealth ratio, and this is measured as netfinancial
liabilities of state and local governments, plus state and local holdings of
federal debt instruments. Again, this is a more accurate measure of the state
and local debt which must be absorbed by the private sector than net state and
local financial liabilities would be.
4Financial intermediaries are conspicuous by their omission in Table 1.
It is reasonable to ignore intermediaries and to take seriously the movements
between private and government debt in Table 1 provided that we take either of
two views of financial intermediaries: that they are a "veil," so that
households view the assets held by intermediaries as if the households held
them directly (see Friedman (1981) for a discussion of this view);
alternatively, we can view intermediaries as independent economic actors, with
asset demands that respond to exogenous changes in much the same way as the
asset demands of other sectors.
5Auerbach and King (1981) contains an exhaustive treatment of the need
for borrowing constraints in Miller—type models.34
6Evenif all risky assets were taxed at the c., investors different
tax brackets would hold different risky portfolios unless (1-u)/(1—c1)
were constant across tax brackets.
7See Fischer (1975) and Merton (1971) for a discussion of this
assumption, and for additional references.
81f there were several risky assets, and if wealth were the only state
variable, the ratio k'j would be given by
1 —U. -( 1)r*





which in general is not independent of the investor's tax bracket. Hence
investors will hold different risky portfolios. The assumption of a single
riskyasset is not completely general, since there is no mutual fund theorem.
91n the usual one-period treatment, G has the interpretation of being
profit plus the liquidation value of the firm and r is then replaced by
(1 + r).In this model, G is simply profit.
10Theassumption that the firmis competitive means that when the firm
changesits financial policy, it ignores any induced changes in the marginal
taxbracket, u.
%'Jhen there is only a single capital gains tax rate candasingle




Thiscorresponds to Miller's (1977) condition for leverage indifference.
12.Thefollowing statements would be true ifinvestors exhibited
linear risk tolerance, i.e. if -/J = a + . Constant relative
risk aversion is a special case, with a = 0.35
131fc. =0,(20) may be rewritten
N. (u* —e)= N.(e-u
1 u<u*1
This can be satisfied only if u*>e. If c. =Aui,the condition becomes
N. (u* —e—xu.(1—e))= N.((1—e)xu.+e—u.)
1 1 u<u*
1 1 1
Increasesin Arequireincreases in u to maintain the equality, soit is
still the case that u>e when there are capital gains taxes. For Anear(1,




whichis the expression in (20) which I take to be positive.
14This is the only equilibrium configuration of debt purchases
consistentwith the proposition that changes in the level of government debt
(given government spending) have no real effects.
15is obviously related to the parameter iiintroduced in Section2.It
will be seen in Section 4 that even if =1,so that all tax liabilities are
fully perceived, it is unlikely that=1exactly. The reasons pertain to
distributional (across tax brackets) effects from future tax liabilities, and
to tax distortions affecting investors in inframarginal tax brackets.
16dF is to be interpreted as the net change in the market value of
government debt outstanding, not the gross issue of government debt.
17As an identity, we have
ci4 =dF + dV + dM = odF
Hence
dV + dM = - (1 - )dF
The interest ratechange required to bring about this change mWisgiven
implicitlyby
dMdY dr
(-a-- + = — (1 - '5) (in)36




= = -(1 - u*)=- (3n) drdpdr p r
since p= (1—u*)r.Substituting (2n) and (3n) into (in) gives (26).
181n the analysis to follow, I will assume for simplicity that investors
have constant absolute risk aversion, so that A is independent of wealth.
Assuming constant relative risk aversion would reinforce the qualitative
resul ts.
19The argument that Barro's result fails in thepresence of non lump—sum
taxes is also made by Tobin (1980, Chapter 3).
20From (20'), if the relative wealth of high—bracket individuals rises,
u must rise to reattain equilibrium.
211fW. and C. are held fixed, then only the last term in (33) can
be affected by leverage changes.
22Frorn (34) and (35), if all taxes are zero or if
(1 —e)(1—c)
=1—ufor every investor, then a change in leverage
will have no effect on utility.
23Recall that high bracket investors are allowed to buy and sell
unlimited quantities of equity and municipal debt, and low bracket investors
can buy and sell unlimited quantities of taxable debt and equity. Government
debt has real effects because there are investors in inframarginal tax
brackets in this model.
24Gordon and Malkielcompare the yields on bond issues by the same
firms, with the same indenture provisions, except that one issue is tax exempt
and the other taxable. This is as pure a measure of u as could be asked.37
25Debt costs must be a convex function of B in order for (41) to define
an optimal leverage position.
argument was made by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), who did not,
however, explore the implications of inflation for leverage policy.
27Appropriate interest rate series were obtained from the Troll Citibank
database to use in adjusting the debt to market value. All business debt was
adjusted using the average yield to maturity on all ong-ten corporate debt
outstanding; federal debt using the yield on government bonds with a maturity
in excess of ten years; municipal debt using an average yield on high quality
municipal issues, and household mortgage debt using a mortgage rate.38
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Fischer, and to Alex Kane, Alan Marcus and participants intheB.U. finance
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1945 .431 .304 .013
1946 .419 .283 .011
1947 .394 .246 .011
1948 .385 .225 .013
1949 .393 .224 .014
1950 .365 .190 .016
1951 .344 .167 .016
1952 .348 .161 .017
1953 .356 .161 .019
1954 .343 .150 .022
1955 .331 .132 .023
1956 .320 .118 .023
1957 .329 .117 .025
1958 .312 .108 .025
1959 .313 .102 .026
1960 .324 .100 .029
1961 .316 .094 .029
1962 .341 .096 .032
1963 .340 .089 .030
1964 .342 .085 .030
1965 .339 .078 .029
1966 .344 .076 .030
1967 .329 .071 .027
1968 .317 .065 .025
1969 .322 .059 .025
1970 .334 .062 .028
1971 .344 .064 .029
1972 .347 .060 .028
1973 .361 .057 .027
1974 .371 .057 .024
1975 .365 .065 .023
1976 .372 .068 .025
1977 .384 .067 .025
1978 .372 .061 .022
Source: FederalReserve Board of Governors. Data are described in
detail in Data Appendix.Figure 1
— TaxableDebt Ratios, 145—1978
Declining figure: Ratio of net feceral liaoiiities
state and local holdings) to wealth.
Rising figure: Ratio of household plus business liaoilities (market
value; corporate plus noncorporate (including farm))
to wealth.
Source: Feceral Reserve Board of Governors; see appendix for
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(market value lessFi9ure 2
Debt to Firm Value Ratio, All Business, 1945—1978
Ratio of credit marKet instruments issued by business (corporate plus
non—corporate) divided by sum of corporate equity, corporate debt, and
replacement value of tangibles owned by non—corporate business.
Adjustment to market value described in appendix










MARGINALPERSONAL TAX RATE, u
FIcI.TRE3
Under certainty, fInancial equilibrium is obtained when the
marginal personal taxrateequals the corporate tax rate. The aggregate




Under uncertainty, financial equilibrium is obtaIned when
the aggregate demand for assets by high tax—bracket investors,
m +eh,equals the wealth of high tax—bracket investors, w.
WEALTH OF INVESTORS WITH u>u
TOTALWEALTH